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1. INTRODUCTION
Asymmetric warfare operations (1) 
require soldiers, but especially ofﬁ  cers 
with command responsibilities, to 
make deep changes of mentality, 
professional attitude and also of tactics 
(2) with respect to the traditional 
preparation for conventional war 
operations, all themes on which an 
abundant literature has developed (3).
For commanders at all levels, 
operating in an asymmetric warfare 
environment means being prepared 
to act “in the presence of civilians, 
against civilians, in defence of 
civilians where civilians are the 
targets, objectives to be won, 
as much as an opposing force” 
[1]; it means forgetting some 
fundamental principles of combat 
and accepting to use minimal force 
and only when strictly necessary 
[2]; it means acquiring the ability 
to motivate one’s men and to apply 
these limitations, accepting greater 
personal risk [3]; it means being 
able to assume governance roles in 
local realities that have very different 
cultures, norms and customs from 
those of one’s home country [4], [5]; 
it means being prepared to manage 
a multiplicity of functions, not 
only military, simultaneously [6]; 
it means acquiring interoperability 
with military contingents of nations 
that are very different from one’s 
own [7]; it means having to expand 
one’s professional baggage into sectors 
and disciplines that are far removed 
from one’s education and training [8] 
[9](Blomgren, 2008; Caforio, 2001). It means all this and even more which, 
from time to time and form mission to 
mission, proves to be important and 
necessary.
In this framework of profound 
change of the international military 
context and of commanders’ 
professionalism [10], [5], [11], 
[12] a project of a ﬁ  eld research (4) 
was carried out by an international 
team of interviewers recording the 
assessments and experiences of 
the persons directly concerned, the 
results of which are being published 
in book form [13]. But beyond this 
choral effort, written by numerous 
authors, on the survey’s general 
results, in this paper I would like to 
place the emphasis particularly on the 
experience of those who have lived 
asymmetric warfare operations in a 
command activity, drawing lessons 
learned that will be especially useful 
for their professionalism as ofﬁ  cers 
and commanders.This paper is 
comprised of this brief introduction, a 
chapter devoted to analysis of the data 
collected (5) on the following aspects, 
deemed especially meaningful [9]:
a)  First impression upon arriving 
in the theatre;
b) Relations with local armed 
forces;
c)  Relations with local 
populations and local authorities;
d)  Relations with NGOs;
e)  Relations with other armies;
f)  The impact of the rules of 
engagement;
g)  Training and education;
h) Operational  experiences;
and closes with a section devoted to 
discussion.
2. DATA ANALYSIS
2.1. First impression upon arriving 
in the theatre
The intervention of military units 
in asymmetric warfare operations 
generally occurs in the context of 
failed states also characterized by 
conditions of cultural and economic 
backwardness that provide fertile 
terrain to insurgents for propaganda 
and recruiting. Weakness or non-
existence of a central government, 
its inability to control the territory, 
widespread existence of living 
conditions that are often at the limit 
of survival, and a lack or scarcity 
of basic infrastructure are for 
the most part situations in which 
unit commanders ﬁ  nd  themselves 
compelled to operate. This often 
occurs in countries in which the 
natural environment itself is hostile: 
deserts, mountains, harsh climatic 
conditions, namely circumstances 
that pose considerable logistical 
and organizational problems to 
commanders.
Recognition of this reality – 
always different from what was 
imagined before experiencing it 
in person – therefore very often 
constitutes the ﬁ  rst observation, the 
initial impression upon arrival at the 
mission location by the interviewed 
commanders: an acquisition that is 
also necessary in order to properly 
plan one’s command activity.
This recognition manifests itself 
in expressions like:
TURA03:  Smell and vision of 
misery and chaos surrounded me 
when the doors of the plane are 
opened. In the ﬁ   rst days I thought there was no order and rule in this 
country. And the god had forgotten 
this geography.
TURA06:  I was in Afghanistan 
last year. My ﬁ   rst impression was 
horriﬁ   c. The living conditions of 
Afghan people was so bad. There is 
no security, anywhere and any time 
you can bump into an explosion.
SAA5:  My  ﬁ   rst impression was 
a culture shock towards the state of 
deterioration of infrastructure.
SIC49:  Culture shock. He was 
earlier in less developed countries 
like Lebanon and Albania, but 
Afghanistan is something special. On 
one hand this is feudal society.
In addition to culture shock, the 
impact with the natural environment 
appears signiﬁ  cant as well, shown by 
responses like:
ITC29: A strange sensation: you 
go out from the plane and the ﬁ  rst 
feeling is of heat, dust: it seems that 
you are inside boundless barracks. 
You have no idea of what can exist 
outside....
KRA01:  I had a feeling of 
desolation due to hot weather over 
50 degree C. and sandstorm. I was 
worried about life over the next sixth 
months since all the roads leading to 
the unit were located in desert.
As well as the impact with the human 
environment:
SPAA02:  Regarding his ﬁ  rst 
mission (Enduring Freedom, led by 
US), after the harsh impact of climate 
conditions, he was shocked by the 
economical inequality of the local 
society, with a narrow rich class and 
a broad poor class.
SAC01:  The impression was 
one of hostility, emanating from the 
government forces and also from the 
local population. The local forces were 
disorganized, not paid in salaries, but 
also tried to show some pride in their 
looks and actions. The rich citizens 
were very hostile and unwelcoming. 
Poverty was everywhere and nobody 
gave a damn.
It is a question of an impact 
that refers to more than one theatre, 
although with different nuances, 
and that leads commanders to be 
concerned with the future living 
conditions of their unit during the 
mission, with frequent statements, 
as we have seen, of the type: I was 
worried about life over the next sixth 
months since all the roads leading to 
the unit were located in desert.
2.2. Relations 
with local armed forces
In many asymmetric warfare 
missions the military units deployed 
are called on to train and collaborate 
with local armed forces and police. 
The reconstruction of an efﬁ  cient state 
depends on re-establishing general 
security conditions, guaranteed by 
prepared, efﬁ  cient local forces that 
can ensure these conditions even 
after the departure of the intervening 
allied forces.
It thus seems particularly 
interesting to examine the opinions of 
the interviewed ofﬁ  cers on relations 
with the local forces.
These relations are often difﬁ  cult 
or, at the least, go through an initial 
period of difﬁ  culty and distrust. We 
see  ﬁ   rst of all a profound cultural 
gap between the soldiers from 
developed countries sent on mission 
and the local armed forces and police. At best, there are difﬁ  culties 
of language comprehension and 
mentality. At worst, the mixture can 
include corruption, bad faith, double-
crossing and money scams, often 
rife among the soldiers of the local 
forces. However, the situation differs 
depending on the theatre in which 
the asymmetric warfare operations 
take place. From the interviewees’ 
responses, it is particularly negative 
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in some 
Central African countries, better 
in the Balkans and Lebanon. The 
following interview sums up the 
situation well:
ITC16: We met some difﬁ  culties 
in cooperating with Afghan armed 
forces, because we had to interact 
with persons who have a culture 
and a lifestyle very different from 
us. Their military preparation was 
very low. We had to train them and 
they behaved as children playing: 
anyway, we had the opportunity to 
see some results from the training. 
We carried out joint operations with 
them and they seemed rather motivated 
(but very bad equipped). Surely some 
of them was double crossing and there 
was the possibility to ﬁ  nd some soldiers 
trained by us on the insurgents’ side.
Differences of course also exist 
from unit to unit, or even from soldier to 
soldier, whose motivations might be the 
salary, the desire to serve one’s country, 
unemployment, and other contingent 
reasons. One must also consider the local 
soldier in the reality of his country, with 
the bonds that religion, tradition and 
customs impose on him. The religious 
factor can be particularly important in 
some theatres, as seen from the following 
statement by a Turkish ofﬁ  cer:
TURA03:  There is sympathy 
towards our army members because 
of religion factor. Sharing the 
common value patterns put us in 
different position among other army 
members.
Digging deeper into the reality 
of the individual theatres, for 
Afghanistan (on which the negative 
observations are especially numerous) 
it is claimed that the Afghan soldier 
lacks team spirit: each person 
seems to work by himself, does not 
have the idea of organization, does 
not care about planning; he has a 
different perception of the value 
of human life; sometimes he uses 
drugs. Others do not feel they have 
any duty to perform their service but 
they have to receive some form of 
reward, gift or bribe. Consequently, 
often the Afghan units remain in 
wait, expecting the ISAF forces to 
“open the breach”. An example of 
the difﬁ   culties of collaboration is 
given by the following response by 
an interviewee:
SPAA04:  Working alongside 
Afghan forces was very complicated, 
mainly due to cultural and idiomatic 
barriers as well as by professional 
procedures and huge technological 
gaps. Besides that there was a strong 
feeling of distrust between both 
forces.
The situation for the countries of 
Central Africa is not very different, 
however. The South African ofﬁ  cers 
had this to say about the local 
forces:
SAC17:  Armed forces: Poorly 
organized and trained. Lack of proper 
leadership. Corruption on higher level. Poorly equipped and poor 
facilities. Personal relationships with 
rebel groups on certain levels.
SAC02: Sometimes it is expected 
from you to make ﬁ  nancial donations 
to build a working relationship, but 
that is a trap. Eventually you can 
become an additional source of crime 
and not a serious work partner.
And for Iraq:
BGC14: You can’t trust them. They 
are lazy and irresponsible. So many 
Iraqi people die every day because of 
their irresponsibility (Iraqi Ground 
Forces Command).
The general, widespread feeling 
is that to rebuild reliable and efﬁ  cient 
local armed forces according to 
Western parameters is going to 
take a long time; times not always 
compatible with the foreseen duration 
of the mandate.
2.3. Relations 
with local populations 
and local authorities
The reception of the forces by 
the local populations in the theatre of 
operations is often multifaceted and 
conditioned by various factors, such as:
1. the pressure of the insurgents 
on the population;
2. the tactical behaviour of the 
counterinsurgency forces: if they 
conduct combat operations locally, the 
people remain distrustful and hostile; 
if the activity is humanitarian aid, they 
show themselves to be friendly;
3. the population’s disposition 
towards the country’s legitimate 
government;
4. the historical experience of the 
local population;
5. the conduct of the 
counterinsurgency forces;
6.  the cultural background 
of those forces: if there is a shared 
religion, the attitude is more likely to 
be favourable, as mentioned earlier;
7.  the relationship with the local 
authorities.
Some examples follow. 
For point 1:
ITC12:  In some village 
relationships are not easy; it happens 
that the local authorities fear to let 
you come in, because the threat 
of insurgents’ retaliations. In fact 
retaliations are frequent.
For point 2:
ITC18:  Local population is 
a victim of the situation: it is in 
favour of the coalition forces where 
and when they make humanitarian 
assistance; less in favour where 
military operations are carried on.
ITC07: We had a good welcome by 
local population, particularly when 
we intervened when it needed help 
(during the winter, for instance) or in 
the more far and isolated villages.
For point 3 one must remember 
that, normally, military units that 
come into contact with individual 
villages represent the legitimate local 
government, with its bright spots and 
dark spots. Some testimonies:
SAC01:  The local government 
was a nightmare, to say the least. To get 
something done was a laborious process 
involving lengthy debates and decision 
making. Money inevitably had to change 
hands. Corruption was strongly suspected.
PHIC20:  I have learned that 
when you enter a village, you are the 
lobbyist for government programs; 
you are the face of government.As far as the local population’s 
historical experience is concerned, 
its attitude appears to be clearly 
inﬂ  uenced by past experiences and 
can be differentiated from group to 
group. For example:
SAC53: Local population: It was 
interesting that the Tutsi got on very 
well with the white ofﬁ  cers – they are 
the minority. The Hutus were less 
friendly. All the interpreters were 
Tutsi and this was problematic as 
they hate the Hutus.
Conduct is an essential aspect of 
the ability of the counterinsurgency 
forces to win the hearts and minds of 
local populations. Adopting correct, 
impartial behaviour is the key, also 
in view of the fact that a foreign 
force present on the local territory is 
inevitably perceived as an invader. 
Examples:
TURA03:  People accept all 
soldiers as invaders without country 
classiﬁ  cation. They just want to get 
some beneﬁ  t like money or food from 
you. This is the way most of people 
behave us.
SAC01:  Local population: 
Burundi/DRC: The local population 
deﬁ   nitely saw the opportunity to 
exploit the RSA soldiers to the 
maximum. We utilized their local 
knowledge and rewarded them 
accordingly. But nothing you got was 
for free. Social, sport etc. interactions 
always had a price you had to pay. 
Unfortunately our soldiers exploited 
their poverty status by exploiting 
their ladies.
PHIB14: We always emphasized 
the highest standard of discipline 
because whatever efforts we have, 
if the soldiers commit mistakes, the 
whole organization will be affected.
The beneﬁ  t of a common cultural 
and religious background is especially 
the case for Islamic culture, as many 
asymmetric warfare operations have 
been and are being carried out in 
Islamic countries. A Turkish ofﬁ  cial 
states, for example:
TURA25: Local people had the 
same culture like Turkish people. 
So that Afghan people and Turkish 
ofﬁ  cers were able to understand each 
other easily. Also the religion was an 
important factor to establish good 
relationship with local people.
The relationships of the 
commanders deployed in asymmetric 
warfare operations with the local 
authorities are often negative. 
Corruption, collusion with the 
insurgents, and attempts to exploit 
the situation and the military units are 
very often the prevalent connotation 
of the local political, but also 
military, leadership. The examples of 
negative assessments of this type are 
extremely numerous. Here are a few 
of them:
DKC20: I worked with authorities 
in the form of ofﬁ  cials, politicians, 
police and army. Basically I did not 
trust government ofﬁ  cials and police. 
They were corrupt, secretly helped 
our enemies and committed atrocities 
against the local population. The 
contact with them was necessary 
and was respectful, though I felt 
resentment and a sense of moral 
corruption by talking to them.
ITC08: Local authorities were not 
always collaborating: in some case 
we registered persons who run with 
the hare and hunt with the hounds; in 
other cases corrupted authorities.Some cases of positive relations 
are cited as well, such as that of an 
Italian colonel who says:
ITC17: The head of the village is 
very important and I had with several 
of them a very positive relationship, 
including some warning on possible 
threats. Distribution of relief was 
through local police or Afghan army; 
the heads of the villages indicated the 
poorest families.
2.4. Relations with NGOs
The relationship between military 
commanders and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) appears to be 
one of mutual distrust which, in the 
judgement of the commanders, arises 
from poor preparation of the members 
of the NGOs in peace operations 
in general and in the context of 
asymmetric warfare in particular. The 
NGOs are seen as a problem from 
which, insofar as possible, it is best to 
keep one’s distance. The testimonies 
in this sense are numerous:
SAC53:  We avoided the NGOs 
like the plague. Most were staffed by 
young European women who were 
passionate about what they were 
doing, but did not know actually what 
to do. They considered the military as 
an obstacle. Their objectives and the 
military objectives were not always 
the same.
SPAC18:  In the case of those 
NGOs there is ignorance or 
misunderstanding about the peace 
forces role, and that creates false 
expectations.
The biggest problem that is posed 
for commanders at the various levels 
is that of monitoring NGO operators’ 
activities, aimed at keeping them from 
getting themselves into dangerous 
situations or from interfering with the 
military activities. Some examples:
SAC50:International organizations, 
NGOs, press, etc: Difﬁ  cult to engage 
with because they wanted to be seen 
as being unrelated to the military, 
regardless of what your main 
responsibility is.
DKC20: I felt that many NGOs 
considered themselves as superior 
and that we (soldiers) were part of 
the problem.
Thus, comparison is inevitable 
between the organized and at times 
schematic military mindset and the 
spontaneous, voluntaristic, at times 
anarchic mentality of NGOs. For 
example:
SPAC06:  I had more relations 
with NGOs, especially in Kosovo. 
I don’t like the way they work. Our 
procedure is more ordered, clearer. 
What I saw is NGOs didn’t have a 
clear idea of what their mission was. 
My feeling was that they didn’t do 
their work properly.
2.5. Relations with other armies
One salient characteristic of 
asymmetric warfare operations 
is generally cooperation between 
armed forces of many nations, many 
more than in past experiences of 
conventional wars. This happens 
because peacekeeping has become 
an indispensable condition for 
development of the industrialized 
world, and every country of this world 
is called on to help keep the peace in 
accordance with its possibilities.
Such cooperation involves 
big problems of integration and 
coordination that are generically lumped together under the term 
“interoperability”. Interoperability 
has constituted the leitmotif for 
international alliances like NATO 
(and others), which has accomplished 
a huge organizational task by creating 
“standard operating procedures” 
(SOPs). Interoperability thus appears 
to be pretty much guaranteed among 
the countries belonging to these 
alliances, while it must always 
be strived for and achieved with 
and between third-party countries. 
Cultural differences, though, cannot 
be codiﬁ  ed and are more difﬁ  cult to 
harmonize.
For the NATO countries it must 
also be said that, since SOPs are 
better for dealing with technical and 
operational problems than human 
ones, interoperability is more easily 
attained for services that have easily 
codiﬁ   able technical procedures, 
such as navies and air forces, while 
for ground forces, where the human 
factor takes on greater importance, 
the difﬁ  culties appear to be greater.
This situation is also the case for the 
interviewees of our research, taking 
into account that all of them belong 
to countries bound by international 
alliances (NATO, SEATO, etc.). 
This means that the responses of the 
interviewees belonging to navies and 
air forces for what concerns relations 
with the forces of other countries are 
of the following type: ... coordination 
was easy with the navies who belong 
to NATO, because we have a common 
cultural background, common 
procedures.
Examples of issues with 
interoperability problems between 
the soldiers of countries belonging to 
Western-style international alliances 
and those of third-party countries are 
frequent, with statements of this sort:
SPAC05:  We had contact with 
troops from India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia... the relations with the 
Polish were rather good. With the rest 
it was quite indifferent, even bad. We 
had many misunderstandings with 
the Indonesians. Our procedures 
were way too different.
While relations with members of 
the same alliance generally prove to 
be easy:
ITC07: We worked with American, 
French, Spanish, Canadian 
colleagues without problems of 
interoperability.
There are a few exceptions, 
however, that highlight the existence 
of a cultural gap between the soldiers 
of the largest powers (US, France, 
UK) on one side and the others, where, 
for the former, judgments like the 
following one are also expressed:
SAC02: Experienced people from 
the major powers (France, UK, etc.) 
as dominating and arrogant, mostly 
working in the interest of their own 
countries and not the mission.
BGC06:  A little arrogant, 
especially the British…
DKC21:  I must admit that I very 
quickly grew tired of the Americans, whose 
style is somewhat more hierarchical and 
vociferous than what we know.
Or behaviours hard to reconcile 
with a multinational environment are 
pointed to:
TURA24:  Most of the military 
personnel were US in NTM-A HQ. So, 
US folks were conducting daily life 
as if it was a pure US HQ. They were 
doing some ceremonies according to US traditions since they were the 
majority. I respected their rituals. But 
in a multinational environment there 
must be multinational culture and daily 
life. I don’t have to celebrate US special 
days or I don’t have to eat meal on a 
dining table covered by a US ﬂ  ag.
Or which create feelings of 
relative deprivation in comparison:
KRA03: I felt that welfare support 
for soldiers in the US military was 
enormous (e.g., welfare facilities such 
as gym, swimming pool, BX, mess, 
etc., and programs for leisure time 
through voluntary participation). 
On the contrary, I felt support in our 
case is insufﬁ  cient, and leisure time 
programs sometimes appeared as a 
burden like an event or daily routine.
Cultural afﬁ   nity instead works 
positively, such as in responses like 
the following ones:
SIC 42: Also with allied forces 
relations were excellent. He worked 
together especially with Italian alpines 
who have similar mentality like Slovenes.
PHIS08:  I have participated in 
Philippine Humanitarian Support 
Mission in East Timor for 6 months 
in 1999. I am good friends with 
members of Australian Army. When 
I was in East Timor, we often shared 
our ideas about our political/country 
setting and our military experiences. 
The Philippine military has more 
in counterinsurgency operations; 
but the Australians have more in 
technology.
SPAC17:  There was more 
afﬁ  nity among non-English-speaking 
countries or with certain difﬁ  culties 
to speak English (Spain, Italy and 
France) on one side and among 
English-speaking countries or akin on 
the other (English, Irish, American, 
Scandinavian, Dutch, Swiss, etc.).
As it can be seen, the human 
factor and its role in interpersonal 
relations remains a major problem 
for commanders with respect to 
technical interoperability and 
operating procedures.
2.6. The impact 
of the rules of engagement
In operations whose ultimate aim 
is always that of re-establishing peace 
and that take place in most cases in the 
middle of civilian populations, special 
importance is taken on by the “rules 
of engagement” (ROEs), i.e., the rules 
that govern the conduct of the units 
deployed in action, with the chief goal 
of avoiding civilian casualties while 
still protecting the safety of the soldiers 
on mission. The particularity of these 
missions is therefore that of avoiding 
civilian casualties and collateral damage 
as much as possible in a delicate balance 
with the need not to expose one’s 
soldiers to unnecessary risks. ROEs are 
created and reﬁ  ned for this purpose.
ROEs have ﬁ   rst and foremost a 
political value. They are decided in the 
political sphere and differ from theatre 
to theatre, in an effort to shape them in 
accordance with the local situation.
On the military side, ROEs are 
highly unpopular due to the limits 
they pose on commanders’ freedom of 
action and to an alleged contradiction 
with the soldier’s professional 
parameters. Some examples of these 
positions:
ITC16: ROEs: they are not always 
understandable, because they are 
written by politicians.SPAC06: ROEs should be settled 
by the commander-in-chief of the 
deployed troops, as he witnesses the 
ongoing reality.
SAB09: The ROE was a challenge 
because in certain instances the 
local population indicate they will 
attack you for no apparent reason 
and you can’t shoot unless the 
mission commander gave permission 
otherwise. The UN protects the locals 
and then the peacekeepers – your 
word means nothing.
SPAC16:  ROEs I think they 
are very restrictive, even affecting 
negatively the safety of the personnel 
deployed in the operational zone.
In particular, improper use of 
equipment and weaponry is a frequent 
complaint:
ITA01:  Our aircraft (Tornado) 
is organised for ground attacks, 
but it has been employed for air 
reconnaissance only: a very limited 
use of this kind of aircraft. It was 
forbidden to use bombs, for fear of 
collateral damages.
But perhaps the most widespread 
complaint regards the differences in 
ROEs depending on the country the 
contingent belongs to. Indeed, various 
countries set limitations (in general 
risk limitations) – called “caveats” 
– on the use of their personnel, with 
negative consequences both on the 
morale of the personnel and on the 
ability to command them. Various 
examples include:
TURA08:  In Afghanistan since 
we had many national caveats, I 
couldn’t work with our allies in many 
areas that NATO soldiers are having 
engagements.
SIC01:  ROE did obstruct their 
work in the ﬁ  eld, especially regarding 
their monitoring tasks with the ANA. 
He [the commander] trained them, 
mentored them, however, because of 
ROE, he was not allowed to follow 
them in the ﬁ  eld. Members of ANA 
did not understand this.
DKA04:  But it could be very 
difﬁ  cult to work on tasks with many 
different units, each with their own 
ROE or interpretation of this.
BGC02:  National caveats are 
imposed to limit the participation of 
the Bulgarian troops in dangerous 
situations. This is a problem.
And at times, political tactics put 
the troops on the ground in difﬁ  culty, 
as in the case that follows, recounted 
by a Bulgarian lieutenant colonel:
BGC17: ROE Yes. We had been 
requested by the German contingent 
to guard a school of civilians, if 
necessary. For months we have not 
received response from Bulgaria. 
This was an embarrassing situation, 
especially given the fact that we 
were completely on their (German) 
logistical support.
2.7. Training and education
The participation of military 
units of the countries considered in 
this study in asymmetric warfare 
operations constituted an important, 
signiﬁ   cant screening both of 
commanders’ education for the 
military profession in general and 
of their speciﬁ  c preparation for this 
type of mission. This appears to be 
even more true for the militaries of 
the medium-sized powers considered 
in this study, which had not had many 
other occasions to put themselves to 
the test in the recent past.The general framework that 
emerges from the interviews is 
that of a positive assessment of the 
professional preparation of the units 
sent on mission, with differing degrees 
of intensity for the various countries 
considered: a more generalized 
positive assessment for the Danish, 
Italian and Spanish respondents, a 
less convinced judgement for Turks 
and Bulgarians. Even the most 
satisﬁ  ed respondents, however, note 
the scarce availability in their home 
countries of the equipment that would 
be used on the mission (6):
SPAC18: We must make an effort 
to provide the units that are to take 
part in a mission the equipment, 
weapons and vehicles they will have 
to deal with on the operational zone, 
so that they have a proper training.
ITC16:  TRAINING AND 
EDUCATION: adequate to the 
situation. We can improve our training 
if we get more means at home.
Opinions on the speciﬁ  c 
preparation for the individual mission 
offer a different picture. Numerous 
respondents (from more or less 
all of the countries) feel that their 
preparation was inadequate.
SAA03: It was evident that more 
than half of the members deployed 
were not properly trained for the 
speciﬁ  c operation.
BGA52: I lacked adequate pre-
deployment training.
DKA04: My basic training was 
good. The more speciﬁ  c training for 
the mission was very poor.
SIC38: Training and preparation 
was almost completely out of reality. 
Especially training in Hochfelzn, 
Germany, was waste of time and 
money. The best preparations began, 
when you came into battle theatre 
and when your forerunners were 
informing you what’s going on.
And, as this last interviewee 
declares, it is the on-the-ground 
experience, the contact with one’s 
predecessors that is the most 
important element of the preparation, 
an element that enters into action 
only after the start of the mission, 
however.
ITC23: In Afghanistan we had to 
learn on the ﬁ  eld, because the theatre 
was very different in respect to the 
previous ones (Bosnia and Iraq).
ITC90:  Adequate, but you 
specially learn by more experienced 
colleagues and you build your own 
experience, step by step.
Here, too, the comparison with 
the armed forces of the major powers 
again comes to the fore:
ITA03:  TRAINING AND 
EDUCATION. Adequate, but I 
suggest an improving of resources, 
so that we can carry out a training 
equivalent to that of the Americans 
and British.
With regard to proposals for better 
preparation for the mission, mostly 
what emerges is acknowledgement of 
the profound difference of command 
action in an asymmetric warfare 
context compared to conventional 
warfare, and therefore of the necessity 
of speciﬁ  c preparation:
SAB01:  I think more training 
in the asymmetric ﬁ  eld would have 
assisted me in handling the situation. 
Conventional war is simple and 
straightforward. My training was 
deﬁ   nitely inadequate for the task I 
was given and that goes for everyone who was under my command. More 
emphasis during training should be 
placed on irregular or asymmetric 
warfare.
These are followed by a series 
of speciﬁ  c observations such as that 
of making more use of experiences 
gained in the ﬁ  eld,  improving 
knowledge and comprehension of the 
“lingua franca” (i.e. English), training 
units in environmental contexts 
more similar to that of the mission, 
developing, especially in cadres, 
greater cultural knowledge of local 
populations, and improving ofﬁ  cers’ 
knowledge of rules and procedures for 
working in multinational formations. 
Some examples:
ITA02:  TRAINING AND 
EDUCATION: adequate; what was 
very different in respect to the training 
is the operation environment  (high 
mountain) that would need a different 
training, not possible in Italy. Besides 
that, it would be convenient to make 
more night training.
TURA19: The major problem is lack 
of speaking English and the listening 
English skills of our personnel.
BGA16: There must be interactions 
between people who have occupied a 
position in past mission and people who are 
about to hold it after. There must be more 
detailed information about the environment 
in which someone is going to work.
2.8. Operational experiences
The range of new experiences 
that the interviewed sample reports 
encountering in the operations in 
which they took part in the various 
theatres includes numerous aspects of 
asymmetrical warfare. A good number 
of these constituted experiences 
they had never before had, ﬁ  rst 
and foremost the “baptism of ﬁ  re”. 
Coming under enemy ﬁ  re for the ﬁ  rst 
time was experienced as an important 
event by most of the interviewees, 
irrespective of home country, and its 
perception appears signiﬁ  cant in all 
the recorded interviews.
ITC94: It was a strong emotion to 
be under ﬁ  re.
DKC1:  In Iraq, we were under 
rocket ﬁ  re for 85 days, where we fell 
down on our stomach.
It is also interesting to note the 
variety of situations in which coming 
under  ﬁ   re took place: air support, 
anti-piracy interventions, ambushes, 
mopping-up operations, improvised 
mines, suicide attacks, salvos of 
rockets and mortar rounds directed at 
the base. Examples:
ITA04: We were ready to take off in 
30’. We made inﬁ  ltration operations, 
exﬁ   ltration from dangerous zones, 
reconnaissance, convoy escort, 
medical rescue. In Afghanistan 
land is very mountainous and radio 
communications are difﬁ  cult. I was 
involved in ﬁ  re conﬂ  ict several times: 
it happened also that my helicopter 
was hit.
TURA01: Yes, I have operational 
experiences. I took part in counter-
insurgency operations as a company 
and a battalion commander. I was 
wounded twice in action. Most of 
these operations were small unit size 
operations in harsh conditions (i.e. 
mountainous, highly vegetated areas).
PHIC17:  ...the detachment was 
ambushed. I went back to Maitum where the 
command center is to wait for reinforcement. 
One soldier was wounded as the platoon 
was pinned down by rebel MILF forces.All this did not happen in a typical 
war environment but prevalently 
among the civilian population, where 
the aggressors are often intermingled 
and disguised.
BGC14:  There were bullets 
coming “from nowhere”…
PHIB9:  Deﬁ   nitely there were 
women and children combatants.
PHIC14:  In one engagement, 
I hesitated for a moment because the 
rebel was a female.
Operations certainly and severely 
tried the preparation and character 
of soldiers and the abilities of 
commanders. The former often had to 
get on-the-ground experience before 
acquiring a true command capability 
and did not escape from the general 
rule for these types of operations, 
namely that the novice has to learn 
from the more experienced.
SAB01:  OPERATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES: I learnt from on 
the ground operations, everything 
happens quickly. Instinct and training 
and a bit of luck takes over. The lack 
of training that the rebel groups 
have gives you an advantage but 
the anger, willingness, aggression, 
unprofessionalism of the rebel groups 
gave us problems.
But also those who were not 
directly involved in ﬁ  re  ﬁ  ghts 
constantly lived under this threat, 
especially in theatres like Iraq 
and Afghanistan. Overall it seems 
clear that the asymmetric warfare 
environment often leads to risk 
perceptions typical of war.
The richness of experience gained 
in the operations in which the ofﬁ  cers 
of the sample participated thus 
constituted an entirely respectable 
training process, with a view to that 
constabulary soldier whose birth 
Morris Janowitz [2] predicted ﬁ  fty 
years ago.
3. DISCUSSION
The data analyzed in the preceding 
sections show both the command 
problems encountered by ofﬁ  cers in 
asymmetric warfare contexts and the 
possible (or desirable) solutions.
The national environment presents 
commanders ﬁ  rst of all with a signiﬁ  cant 
challenge at logistical level, as well 
as one involving the morale of the 
soldiers, relegated to living long periods 
in much harsher conditions than those 
normally experienced in the homeland. 
The importance of motivating one’s 
subordinates and creating occasions 
and structures suitable for alleviating 
the hardships of life on operations 
constitute the main problems of ofﬁ  cers 
with command responsibilities.
On the one hand, the unreliability 
of the human environment contributes 
to creating feelings of risk in the 
soldier, while on the other it lends 
itself, due to the poor living conditions 
and the well-being gap compared 
to the contingent’s home country, 
to strengthening the humanitarian 
motivations, especially if they are 
adequately valued by the commander.
Closely tied to the speciﬁ  c theatre 
of operations is the ease or difﬁ  culty 
of establishing and maintaining 
good relations with the local armed 
forces for whom the commanders 
of the units on mission often 
perform a mentoring function. The 
shortcomings that often characterize 
the soldiers of these forces in terms of both equipment and motivation 
constitute a major challenge to the 
command and coordination skills 
of the commander on mission in 
the territory. Contexts where these 
problems are on display require 
a long and extensive educational 
effort regarding the local forces, a 
job that often exceeds the duration 
granted for the mission itself. A part 
of this picture is also the necessity 
of instructing one’s own personnel 
to be on guard against displaying 
attitudes of superiority or disdain for 
the culture of the local armed forces.
As already evidenced by 
Abrahamsson [1] one of the peculiar 
characteristics of asymmetric conﬂ  ict 
is that the strong side forces are 
forced to operate and even to ﬁ  ght in 
the midst of local populations, to act 
on their behalf even in the presence 
at times of latent hostilities, under a 
constant threat from insurgents dressed 
in street clothes and who blend in and 
become indistinguishable from the 
civilians. Every commanding ofﬁ  cer, 
at any level of command, thus ﬁ  nds 
himself having contacts and relations 
with both local populations and local 
authorities.
These relations are not always 
easy, and one premise is that the 
ofﬁ  cer must understand the mood of 
the population and the attitude of often 
corrupt authorities, sometimes forced 
to steer a middle course between 
insurgents and intervention forces. 
The result is the necessity of being 
able to develop a humanitarian aid 
programme that is sensitive to local 
moods and needs and suitable for 
winning hearts and minds, as stated 
by the theoreticians of asymmetric 
warfare [3].
The research data, illustrated in 
the section devoted to their analysis, 
show the changeability of the 
attitudes of populations in accordance 
with the type of action carried out by 
the units on mission; the difﬁ  culty 
of overcoming cultural prejudices 
against the intervention forces; 
the necessity of not appearing as 
occupation forces; the embarrassment 
of also representing often corrupt and 
inefﬁ  cient local governments. It is in 
these relations that the asymmetric 
warfare environment presents all its 
speciﬁ   city and is often an absolute 
novelty for the deployed forces.
In the ﬁ  eld of humanitarian aid, 
then, as well as in reconstruction 
activities, commanding ofﬁ  cers often 
ﬁ   nd themselves cooperating with 
civilian organizations whose work 
should extend and supplement that of 
the military units. This is a collaboration 
that is not always easy, especially in 
the case of NGOs, which leads some 
interviewees to make statements 
like: We avoided the NGOs like the 
plague. The difﬁ   culty often arises 
from the lack of a higher coordination 
activity able to harmonize two deeply 
different human environments. The 
NGOs in fact appear to be comprised 
of young people characterized by a 
spontaneous, voluntaristic, at times 
anarchic mentality who often lack 
concrete operational experiences and 
frequently put themselves in situations 
of personal risk that must then be 
resolved by soldiers, the very forces 
from whom the NGOs strongly want 
to distinguish themselves.
It is a difﬁ   cult collaboration to 
implement, therefore, one in which the 
commander must know how to bring 
both diplomacy and authoritativeness 
to bear.As we saw in the preceding 
section, the problem of operating 
in collaboration with contingents 
from many different countries, 
characteristic of modern asymmetric 
warfare operations, is not only 
a matter of interoperability. A 
signiﬁ  cant human relations problem 
between soldiers who come from 
very different cultural contexts is 
also present. For example, American 
and Turkish soldiers, members 
of the same alliance, can easily 
share military technologies and 
deployment methods, while their 
respective cultural backgrounds and 
their behaviours remain profoundly 
different.
And it is precisely from the 
standpoint of human relations that 
feelings of relative deprivation are 
created [14], in an amalgam of groups 
of soldiers belonging to different 
countries (Latin versus Northern 
European countries, for example) and/
or religious faiths. Collaboration with 
the commanders of other contingents 
to prevent or smooth over any contrasts 
or misunderstandings is therefore a 
constant concern for the ofﬁ  cer with 
command responsibilities.
The rules of engagement and the 
resulting operational activity require 
a command activity that is above 
all educational, wherever it appears 
difﬁ   cult to get soldiers exposed to 
risk situations to contain and calibrate 
their response. As we have seen from 
the data, widespread contestation 
of the ROEs appears due to fears or 
feelings that the soldier’s safety is 
not given sufﬁ  cient consideration.
In operations undertaken in 
asymmetric warfare environments 
a military unit can also ﬁ  nd  itself 
involved in a ﬁ  re ﬁ  ght. Now, if one 
considers that the majority of the 
soldiers of the countries examined 
here had never before undergone 
the so-called “baptism of ﬁ  re”, one 
immediately grasps how challenging 
and crucial the commander’s task 
of generating proper conduct of his 
subordinates in such situations is.
And it is chieﬂ   y the result of 
effective prior training that enables the 
commander to achieve such conduct in 
the face of an armed attack. The data 
obtained from the ofﬁ  cers’ opinions 
regarding the training received prior 
to deployment on mission thus appear 
particularly meaningful. On this point 
two prevalent opinions are found: 
the  ﬁ  rst is that the general military 
training received appeared adequate 
for the asymmetric conﬂ  ict situations 
encountered; the second is that the 
training for the speciﬁ  c  mission 
(knowledge of the terrain, the culture, 
the social organization, the history) 
was often superﬁ  cial or lacking.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Wishing to glean from the research 
data a set of lessons learned, albeit one 
that is by no means exhaustive, we can 
say that an ofﬁ  cer and commander in 
an asymmetric warfare environment 
should:
a.  know how to create a logistical 
organization capable of functioning 
in particularly difﬁ   cult and isolated 
environments;
b.  be fully aware of the importance 
of relating properly with all the other 
actors present on the territory (local 
armed forces, civilian populations, 
local authorities, other coalition forces, 
international organizations, both 
humanitarian and not);c.  acquire the ability to operate 
(and, if necessary, ﬁ  ght) in the midst 
of civilian populations, respecting 
them as much as possible;
d.  be able to achieve an 
“interoperability of human relations” 
between one’s own soldiers and those of 
the other contingents of the coalition;
e.  attend to the motivations of 
his men, in particular those most 
functional to the mission;
f.  possess skills in the 
preparation, command and control of 
his men in the emergency situations 
typical of asymmetric conﬂ  ict;
g.  be aware that also commanders 
often have to get on-the-ground 
experience before acquiring a true 
command capability;
h.  be able to interpret and explain 
ROEs to subordinates, as well as 
update them to the speciﬁ  c mission;
i.  be able to cope with stress 
situations of one’s personnel, 
resulting both from mission events 
and from prolonged separation from 
the family, as well as reintegration 
into the social life of the home country 
upon returning from the mission.
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ENDNOTES
(1)  An asymmetric conﬂ  ict typically 
involves two actors, one “strong” and 
one “weak”. In this kind of conﬂ  ict, 
strong actors typically have a lower 
interest in winning asymmetric conﬂ  icts 
because their survival is not immediately 
at stake (see Caforio, 2008). According 
to Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew 
(Shultz & Dew, 2006), since the end of 
the Cold War conventional militaries and 
their political leaders have confronted a 
new, brutal type of warfare in which non-
state armed groups use asymmetrical 
tactics to successfully ﬁ  ght  larger, 
technologically superior forces.
(2)  Military professionals thus ﬁ  nd 
themselves faced today with a situation 
that requires not a simple update, but a 
substantial change in their preparation 
and professional performances. Indeed, 
“the change from an invasion defence 
towards a defence based on ﬂ  exible 
response puts the military profession 
under the strain of changing large 
parts of its expert base, as well as 
ethical norms and corporate traditions” 
(Abrahamsson & Weibull, 2008: 13). 
What capabilities, then, are needed 
to deal with these demands? All the 
authors (see Moskos, 1976; Blomgren, 
2008; Gentile, 2008; Nagl, 2009) agree 
in believing that the traditional military 
preparation for conventional conﬂ  icts 
constitutes the indispensable base 
also for the vast range of operations in 
asymmetric warfare. This preparation is 
no longer sufﬁ  cient, however, and other 
skills appear necessary for the military 
professional faced with a new scenario 
(see also Caforio, 2012). For the ethical aspect see 
van Baarda, Th. A. and D.E.M. Verweij, 2009.(3)  So plentiful that it is not possible 
to give an accounting here. In a general 
sense and by way of example we can 
cite: Abrahamsson & Weibull, 2008; 
Caforio, 2008 and 2012; Fitzpatrick, 
2009; Hoffman, 2007; Kaldor, 1999 and 
2003; Nagl 2009.
(4)  The research was carried out in 
the period July 2010 – February 2011 
on a sample that included 237 ofﬁ  cers 
(158 army, 30 navy, 45 air force, 4 other 
forces), questioned by means of in-depth 
semi-structured interviews by a group of 
researchers from the nine participating 
countries (Bulgaria, Denmark, Italy, 
Philippines, Slovenia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Spain and Turkey). The 
choice of the participating countries was 
made by excluding the strongest powers 
and the countries who are the largest 
contributors, which seem have been 
studied extensively before: we tried to 
ﬁ  nd out more about the experiences of 
soldiers from middle-sized powers and 
small countries, not so dominant in the 
international arena. For more detail on 
the research as a whole, see Caforio 
2013b, forthcoming.
(5) In the text that follows, the 
various testimonies are reported using 
the code employed in the research itself. 
In particular, the ﬁ   rst letters indicate 
the home country (for example, IT for 
Italy, PHI for the Philippines, etc.), the 
next letter indicates the armed force the 
interviewee belonged to (C for army, 
B for navy, A for air force), and the 
number that follows is the serial number 
that identiﬁ  es the individual interview.
(6)  The explanation is that small and 
medium-sized military powers found 
themselves having to concentrate 
their best resources in the field and 
little remained back in the homeland 
for training.